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We address continuous variable quantum key distribution (QKD) in non-Markovian lossy channels
and show how the non-Markovian features may be exploited to enhance security and/or to detect
the presence and the position of an eavesdropper along the transmission line. In particular, we
suggest a coherent states QKD protocol which is secure against individual attacks for arbitrarily
low values of the overall transmission line. Our scheme relies on specific non-Markovian properties,
and cannot be implemented in ordinary Markovian channels characterized by uniform losses.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Yz,89.70.+c
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a fundamental
area of quantum technology [1]. The aim of any QKD
protocol is to allow two parties, the sender Alice and the
receiver Bob, to exchange a secret key using quantum
and/or classical channels, avoiding a possible eavesdrop-
per (Eve) to acquire information on the key. Discrete
variable QKD protocols are based on transmission and
measurements of single or entangled photons states, and
therefore they are limited by the efficiency of single pho-
ton generation and detection. On the contrary, continu-
ous variable (CV) QKD [2] is a potentially high-bit-rate
technique for at least two reasons. One the one hand,
the key is encoded into continuous-spectrum quantum
observables as the quadrature components of a light field,
and thus the number of bits per pulse can be high. On
the other hand, it employs homodyne detection technique
based on standard photodiodes, which are much faster
than the avalanche photodiodes used in photon-counting
discrete QKD schemes. Different proposals for CV QKD
have been put forward, either based on single-mode co-
herent [3, 4] and squeezed [5–11] signals or EPR corre-
lated beams [12, 13]. Experimental demonstrations have
been reported for coherent state [3, 4, 14–16], squeezed
[10] and EPR beams [13] based protocols, and uncondi-
tional security proofs have been also given [17]. In the
coherent state protocol, which is the most interesting for
practical applications, Alice encodes a key into ampli-
tudes of pure coherent states and sends them through a
quantum channel to Bob, who randomly chooses a cod-
ing quadrature basis in which to measure via homodyne
detection. Binary data is extracted from the homodyne
sample using the bit-slice reconciliation method and pri-
vacy amplification [18].
The unavoidable losses occurring along the channel
must be taken into account for a realistic description of
any QKD protocol. In fact, it has been shown that losses
can be exploited by eavesdroppers to hide themselves [3].
Security of the protocol is then defined through the equiv-
alent noise referred to the input, i.e. on ensuring that
the information of Bob about the key to be higher than
the one acquired by Eve. Lossy channels considered so
far are Markovian, i.e. characterized by a damping rate
which is constant along the transmission line. This is
usually an approximation and in practice channels may
show non-Markovian losses, i.e. a damping rate which is
not uniform along the transmission line, being dependent
on the spectral structure of the environment coupled to
the propagating mode [19, 20]. Moreover, the increasing
success of reservoir engineering techniques paves the way
to the realization of optical channels in which the losses
due to the interaction with the environment can be ap-
propriately manipulated. Recently, e.g., non-Markovian
signatures in semiconductor quantum wires have been
experimentally observed [21].
In this Letter we address for the first time the effects
of non-Markovian channel losses on the performances of
a CV QKD protocol. In particular, we focus on the co-
herent state protocol and show how the non-Markovian
features may be exploited to enhance security, i.e. to re-
duce the information available for Eve and/or to detect
her presence and position along the transmission line. In
our scheme, a suitable engineering of the channel decay
rate allows us to obtain secure QKD for arbitrarily low
values of the overall transmission line. We also show that
the same result cannot be obtained with ordinary Marko-
vian channels characterized by uniform losses. In the fol-
lowing, we briefly review the coherent state protocol in a
Markovian channel and describe the eavesdropping strat-
egy. We then introduce a relevant class of non-Markovian
channel and generalize the protocol to this case. Finally,
we describe in detail our proposal to enhance security
and show how it is possible to detect the eavesdropper
by a post-communication comparison of part of the data
sent by Alice to Bob. We also discuss how to optimize
the decay properties of the channel for a specific type of
structured environment.
QKD using coherent states — In QKD with coher-
ent states [3], Alice draws pairs of indepedent real ran-
2dom numbers (xA, pA) from two Gaussian distributions
with zero mean and the same variance, and then gen-
erates the coherent states |αA〉 = |xA + ipA〉, which are
finally sent to Bob through a quantum channel. The
propagation along the channel is in general noisy and
losses are described as the interaction of the light mode
with an environment made of a zero temperature en-
semble of independent harmonic oscillators under the
Born-Markov approximation [22]. The evolution is thus
governed by a Master equation in the Lindblad form
˙̺ = γ(2a̺a† − a†a̺ − ̺a†a). The state sent by Al-
ice evolves as |αA〉 → |αAe−γt〉 ≡ |αA√ηM〉, where
ηM ≡ ηM(t) = e−2γt is the channel transmission. We
denote by τ ≡ L (hitherto c = 1) the total transmission
time/channel length. After the propagation Bob receives
the damped states and arbitrarily decides to measure one
of two orthogonal quadratures. Since the key is encoded
in the mean value of the signal sent by Alice, he needs to
rescale the measured observables by an amount equal to
ηM(τ)
−1/2, thus also amplifying the noise.
Eavesdropping strategy — Due to the very nature of
the protocol, the best passive attack Eve may perform is
the use of an optimal asymmetric 1→ 2 cloning machine
[23–25]. This process can be modeled with Eve inter-
cepting the signal with a beam splitter of transmissivity
ηE at position LE = tE along the line. We assume Eve
knows the features of the quantum channel (the lenght τ
and the loss rate γ) and that she can tune with arbitrary
precision both the value of the transmissivity ηE and the
attack time tE. The reflected part of the beam is stored
by Eve whereas the other part is sent to Bob through a
lossless channel. Under these conditions, the best eaves-
dropping strategy is to attack immediately (tE = 0) with
a beam splitter of transmissivity ηE = ηM(τ) [3] equal to
the overall transmissivity of the channel. In this way, Eve
is introducing the same amount of losses as the overall
line: Bob will receive the same state as in the absence
of any attack and the eavesdropper is not detectable. If
however ηM(τ) ≥ 1/2 then, even if not detected, Eve can-
not achieve the same information as Bob about the secret
key and the protocol is secure [3].
Non-Markovian channels — Markovian evolutions are
approximate dynamical models for channel losses and
more realistic situations can be described with Mas-
ter equations derived without the Markov assumption.
As for example, including the non-resonant coupling to
phonons in the description of propagation in fused sil-
ica fibers, leads to delayed nonlinearity due to the non-
Markovian phonon bath in addition to spontaneous and
thermal noise [20]. In the following we consider the non-
Markovian master equation (NME) ˙̺ = γ(t)(2aρa† −
a†aρ− ρa†a), which corresponds to a model in which the
light mode interacts weakly with a structured bosonic
reservoir at zero temperature. The functional form of
the coefficient γ(t) depends on the spectral structure of
the environment in which the system is embedded. In
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FIG. 1: Diagram of the QKD protocol in NM channel with the
relevant elements of Eve’s attack scheme. The solid channel
line refers to the NM channel, the dashed one refers to the
lossless channel used by Eve. Without the eavesdropper, the
channel is non-Markovian throughout its whole length.
the weak coupling regime and for times larger than the
typical reservoir correlation time scale τR, the coefficient
tends to the Markovian constant value, i.e., γ(t) → γM .
By changing the reservoir spectral properties one may
engineer the functional form of γ(t) as well as modify
the value of τR. It is worth noticing that the key fea-
ture in our scheme is the inhomogeneity in the rate of
loss γ. This can also be achieved by a suitably engi-
neered position-dependent coupling to the reservoir along
the optical channel, since γ(x) = γ(ct). In a non-
Markovian channel an initial coherent state evolves as
|αA〉 → |αAe−Γ(t)/2〉 = |αA√ηNM〉 where ηNM(t) = e−Γ(t)
is the channel transmissivity, with Γ(t) = 2
∫ t
0 γ(s)ds.
Because of the time dependence of the coefficient γ(t),
we have in general Γ(t) 6∝ t, i.e. the damping is not
uniform as in the Markovian case. The eavesdropping
strategy described above works in the same way if we let
Eve known the analytic form of the decay rate γ(t). In
this case, the best strategy is still to attack at the be-
ginning of the channel and to choose properly the beam
splitter transmissivity to have ηE = ηNM (τ). In this way
her presence is still non detectable and the results about
the security of the channel reported in [3, 4] still hold.
On the other hand, the time-dependent losses may be
exploited to detect the presence of the eavesdropper and,
in some cases, its position along the line.
Eavesdropping detection in NM channels —One of the
main assumptions in QKD is that everything Alice com-
municates to Bob using public channels is also known
by Eve. This means that, in order to detect a possi-
ble eavesdropper, Alice needs to perform independently
a certain operation during the transmission, leading to
different results at Bob side when Eve is present or not.
In our protocol, Alice still encodes the key into coherent
signals, but now she can act on the channel length by
adding a delay ∆t at the first stage of the signal propa-
gation, as depicted in Fig. 1. For the sake of simplicity,
though we have only one physical channel, we will refer
to the two possible choices as two channels with the same
time-dependent loss rate γ(t) but different length. The
key signal is always sent through the ordinary channel
3of length τ , but now Alice may also send a reference co-
herent state |α0〉 by choosing randomly, with the same
probability, between the ordinary and the longer channel
of length τ +∆t.
Let us start by considering the situation of clean chan-
nel (no eavesdropper) and focus to the results of the
quadrature measurements for the reference state. Bob is
receiving fifty percent of the time the state |α0e−Γ(τ)/2〉
when it is sent through the ordinary line whereas the
rest of the copies evolve into |α0e−Γ(τ+∆t)/2〉. Since Bob
is not aware of which channel has been chosen by Alice,
his quadrature measurements must be independent from
this choice. Therefore he measures quadratures scaled
according to the total ordinary channel losses e−Γ(τ)/2.
After the completion of the session Alice informs Bob
about which channel each reference state has been sent
through. Bob can now distinguish among the two sets of
states and study the statistics of the two measurement
distributions. It is easy to show that these distributions
are Gaussian with same width but they differ in the mean
value by an amount
δxNE = |α0(1− e−(Γ(τ+∆t)−Γ(τ))/2)| ≃ |α0γ(τ)∆t| , (1)
where we assumed that ∆t is small compared to the vari-
ation of γ(t). Moreover the difference in mean value in-
creases as the amplitude α0 increases.
The situation changes when Eve is attacking the line.
Because she also cannot distinguish between the refer-
ence signals and the key ones, as well as between the
choice of channel by Alice, she has to treat every state
on the same foot. She then keeps unchanged the attack-
ing time tE and the beam splitter transmissivity
√
ηE.
If she attacks at tE the transmissivity must be chosen
in a way that e−Γ(tE)/2
√
ηE = e
−Γ(τ)/2 so to be unde-
tectable when the ordinary channel is used. If Alice uses
the longer channel Eve’s attack time is forcefully shifted
to tE +∆t. The same calculation as before for the differ-
ence in the mean values of the quadrature measurement
distribution at Bob side leads to
δxE = |α0(1− e−(Γ(tE+∆t)−Γ(tE))/2)| ≃ |α0γ(tE)∆t| (2)
Because of the time dependence of the loss rate γ(t) the
quantities in Eqs. (1) and (2) are in general different.
Therefore, if after the communication Alice and Bob per-
form a check of the mean values of the distributions using
a public channel, they are able to detect the presence of
Eve whenever γ(tE) 6= γ(τ). This condition cannot be
satisfied in a Markovian channel.
Certain types of non-Markovian channels also intro-
duce thermal noise [27]. Since the added noise is time
dependent, besides the mean values also the widths of
the distributions at Bob side are different in the pres-
ence or absence of an eavesdropper. In turn, this may
be exploited to further enhance security via checking the
sample variances.
FIG. 2: (Colors online) Normalized decay rates (see text) as
a function of time. Red lines correspond to ωc/ω0 = 0.5 and
black lines to ωc/ω0 = 3. ωc = 0.5 for solid lines, and ωc = 3
for dashed lines.
Discussion — Our proposal is based on the fact that,
in a non-Markovian channel, Γ(t + s) 6= Γ(t) + Γ(s)
for generic t, s ≥ 0. The lack of the semigroup prop-
erty immediately implies that the integral expression∫ t+∆t
t γ(s)ds for fixed ∆t is not a constant function of
t. Therefore, the two quantities in Eqs. (1) and (2)
do not coincide and the only way Eve can avoid de-
tection is to attack the channel when γ(tE) ≃ γ(τ).
As a consequence, it is crucial to engineer appropri-
ately the environment surrounding the channel to ob-
tain the desired decay properties. As a concrete ex-
ample we consider here the decay rate evaluated for
an Ohmic reservoir with Lorentz-Drude cutoff [28], i.e.
γ(t) = γM
[
1 − e−ωct cosω0t − (ωc/ω0)e−ωct sinω0t
]
, ω0
being the mode frequency, ωc the cut-off frequency of
the environment spectrum, and γM the asymptotic de-
cay rate. The reservoir correlation time is here identified
with τR = ω
−1
c .
In Fig. 2 we show the behavior of the normalized de-
cay rate γ(t)/γM for different values of light and cut-off
frequencies ω0 and ωc. The red lines are evaluated for
the same ratio ωc/ω0 = 0.5 and differ for the value of
ωc = 0.5 (solid line) and ωc = 3 (dashed line). The black
lines instead correspond to ωc/ω0 = 5 and ωc = 0.5 (solid
line), ωc = 3 (dashed line). Decay rates of this second
class (regime ωc > ω0) are exactly what is needed for our
scheme to work, because the relation γ(tE) < γ(τ) holds
for any allowed value of the attack time tE and Eve has
in principle no way to hide herself from the security pro-
tocol. Moreover, since for ωc > ω0 the function γ(t) is
invertible, Alice and Bob can also find the exact position
of the eavesdropper along the line. On the other hand
decay functions represented by the red lines present os-
cillations before relaxing to the stationary value and are
not invertible. In this case Eve may find several places
at the beginning of the line where she can perform the
attack while avoiding detection, i.e. when γ(tE) = γM .
4Our detection method relies on checking whether the
distributions of homodyne data from the two channels
of different lengths are shifted each other by an amount
δxNE rather than δxE. The ability of detecting an eaves-
dropper thus depends on the precision and the resolu-
tion of quadrature measurements made by Bob. A fi-
nite precision implies that Bob could not be able to
discriminate the results when |α0∆t[γ(t∗E) − γ(τ)]| < ǫ,
with ǫ a threshold depending on the precision. In prac-
tice, this means that whenever Eve places the attack
at tE > t
∗
E
she is not revealed by our method. Ac-
cording to Ref. [3] the channel is then secure when
Γ(tE) ≥ − log 2ηNM , ηNM = exp{−Γ(τ)} being the over-
all transmission of the non-Markovian channel. In other
words, security is ensured if the overall transmission is
larger than ηNM ≥ 12 exp{−Γ(t∗E)} ≡ ηth. For any given
ǫ we can make t∗
E
in principle arbitrarily close to τ by
a suitable engineering of the environment spectrum. In
turn, this allows one to decrease the threshold and make
the channel secure for arbitrarily low values of the over-
all transmission ηNM . Notice also that, being tE of the
order of the reservoir correlation time scale τR, if τR ≪ τ
then the amount of losses accumulated before the attack
are negligible compared to the overall losses and the ad-
vantage given by our protocol cannot be appreciated. In
order to obtain a consistent improvement we need τR to
be of the order of the total transmission time τ .
Conclusion — We have analyzed continuous vari-
able QKD with coherent states in the presence of non-
Markovian effects along the transmission line and sug-
gested a novel method to improve security based on the
non uniform time dependence of the losses. Our method
ensures security for arbitrarily low transmissivity of the
channel and allows one to detect the presence and the
position of the eavesdropper upon both a suitable engi-
neering of the channel decay properties and the use of
an additional reference coherent signal. The eavesdrop-
per can manage to hide her presence by reducing the ex-
tracted amount of information, but the legitimate users
can reduce to zero her information by tuning the reser-
voir correlation time. Our detection scheme is based on
a specific non-Markovian property, and it cannot be im-
plemented in ordinary Markovian channel characterized
by uniform losses. Besides, since it is based on channel
properties rather than on specific features of the distri-
bution scheme, we foresee its application to other CV
QKD protocols, as those based on squeezed or entangled
states.
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